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Abstract
Compensation to CEOs has increased dramatically over the past decades. This increase
over time raises the question of its justifiability. The direct costs of CEO compensation
shall be considered in light of the value added by reduced agency costs that originate from
the principal-agent relationship between CEOs and shareholders. This thesis examines
the determinants of CEO compensation, focusing mainly on company performance. The
study is conducted on 40 Swedish large and mid cap firms, and finally concludes that per-
formance is significant and can partly explain CEO compensation with ROE and EPS as
performance proxies. These results largely support earlier research on the topic that has
been done on other time periods and regions. In addition to performance, the results of
the thesis show that there are other important determinants of compensation, such as firm
size and CEO related characteristics. Ultimately and evidently, several factors are of im-
portance in understanding how CEO compensation is set on the Swedish market.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
CEO compensation has for long been a controversial topic, relating to social and economic
inequalities. Overpayment to managers and board members has caused corporations to
implement internal corporate governance structures to face the external pressure from leg-
islative authorities that act in the interest of shareholders to minimize agency problems.
The question at hand is if compensation to managers is economically motivated or if it
merely erodes shareholder value.
Observing the period from 1980 until 2019, CEOs have seen a large increase in
compensation exceeding both the development of the S&P 500 and the general public’s
wealth. While CEO compensation among the largest 350 firms in the US has increased by
1070 % between 1978 and 2017, the S&P 500 has increased by 637 % (Mishel & Schieder,
2018). The situation in Sweden has been similar with CEO compensation and the return
of the stock market diverging over the last decades.
For companies to use variable pay in the form of bonuses and stock options as CEO
compensation is an old concept that has been embraced during the entire 20th century.
However, the proportion of bonuses was rather modest up until the 1980s when it started
becoming more common, and the trend of increasing variable income has continued ever
since. The proportion of Swedish CEO bonuses went from a fifth of total salaries in
the 1990s to approximately a third in 2005. The increase of using bonus payments in
compensation plans appears to differ by country and region as well. While CEOs in the
US, Australia and Germany only received a small proportion of their compensation in the
form of traditional salary, Nordic countries received a substantially larger proportion as
fixed salary in 2006 (Ba˚ng & Waldenstro¨m, 2009).
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The complexity of how to align interests of managers with those of the shareholders
has led companies to try plenty of different remuneration compositions over the years. The
dilemma of whether short- or long-term structures are more beneficial for the company’s
performance is complicated and there is no consensus in the research community on how
to structure a CEO’s compensation to maximize the efficiency of the firm. The existence
of agency problems has through vast research been established, and its persistency makes
possible solutions to the problem important for all types of organizations around the globe.
1.2 Research Questions
Notwithstanding the vast research done on the subject, there is still no consensus on what
core factor has the largest impact on CEO compensation. Previous studies performed in
the US suggest that the two major determinants of CEO compensation are firm size and
company performance (Agarwal, 1981; Dyl, 1988). This study focuses primarily on firm
performance as a determinant of CEO compensation. Previously, studies on the subject
have been conducted in different regions and during different time periods. This study
wishes to observe the situation on the Swedish market during the period 2013-2017, and
aspires to contribute to the debate on CEO compensation determinants, specifically regard-
ing the impact of performance. Investigating the performance measures ROE and EPS, the
following null hypotheses are examined:
I) Return on Equity does not have an impact on CEO Compensation
II) Earnings per Share does not have an impact on CEO Compensation
The hypotheses aim to investigate the impact of company performance on CEO compen-
sation using two different measures as proxies for true firm performance. Furthermore, the
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effects of performance will also be examined on the components of compensation indepen-
dently, namely bonus and salary. The first hypothesis challenges ROE as a determinant,
while the latter assesses the EPS measure. In the case of rejection of one or both hypothe-
ses, it is subsequently of interest to evaluate the results further, such as the magnitude of
the impact of the variable. The analysis and discussion that follow also address the impact
of other variables included in the model that bear significant explanatory power.
1.3 Contributions and Purpose
This bachelor thesis investigates the relationship between company performance and CEO
compensation on Swedish large and mid cap firms in the context of agency theory. The
purpose of this investigation is to evaluate the impact of company performance on CEO
compensation, with the aspiration of concluding whether compensation paid to CEOs is
truly based on performance. The results of the study will add to previous research done on
the role of compensation as an incentive tool to address agency problems, and it will serve
as a complement to work done on the topic of determinants of CEO compensation from a
Swedish perspective.
1.4 Delimitations
There is a number of delimitations of this thesis. Firstly, the term ‘compensation’ in the
context of the thesis refers merely to aggregate cash payments of salary and bonus to
CEOs. Remuneration plans in the population commonly also include other components,
such as stock option plans, pension plans and severance packages. Therefore, the term
‘compensation’ in this study does not reflect all compensation components paid to CEOs.
Secondly, the study is delimited by its choice of performance proxies. Different mea-
sures of performance are dependent on different figures, such as stock price or net sales.
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Both EPS and ROE rest on net income as the numerator, and one must in this discus-
sion raise the question concerning what proxies best reflect real performance. Previous
research consider a vast array of performance proxies including sales, net profits, stock
returns and profitability measures, with some contrasting results. This study considers
merely the ROE and EPS measures, and while it is argued that these are proper measures
for performance – this delimitation should be noted.
Thirdly, it is important to note that the study suffers from a delimitation in regard
to the data on CEO ownership. Due to restrictive access to ample databases, ownership
is calculated as the percentage of equity that the CEO holds, without accounting for any
voting power. In addition, the data does not include shares that are held indirectly by the
CEO through third party ventures.
Finally, the study focuses only on examining the relationship between firm perfor-
mance and compensation to the CEO. The study does not in any way adjust for the fact
that the rest of top management and the board of directors have an impact on firm perfor-
mance.
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2 Theory Review
2.1 Principal Agent Theory
The main purpose of linking compensation to firm performance is to minimize the prob-
lems that to some extent arise from the very nature of a fiduciary relationship in which the
interests of different parties diverge – agency costs. This stems from the Principal Agent
Theory, and prominent writers on the subject are Jensen & Meckling (1976) who define
an agency relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s))
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves
delegating some decision making authority to the agent”. In the context of this study, the
principal and the agent are throughout considered the shareholders and the CEO, respec-
tively. Jensen & Meckling continue to describe agency costs as the sum of three compo-
nents – namely:
I) the monitoring expenditures by the principal,
II) the bonding expenditures by the agent, and
III) the residual loss
Monitoring expenditure is the component of agency costs which contextually is of the
highest relevance. The category includes costs that the principal incurs to create appropri-
ate incentives for the agent. This is done for the sole purpose of limiting divergences from
the principal’s interests, in an attempt to make the agent maximize firm value. As Jensen
& Meckling (1976) also stipulate, the term ‘monitoring’ includes here not only costs in
terms of measuring or observing the agent, but also tools to control the agent, for example
by compensation policies.
5
Bonding expenditures are, in contrast to monitoring expenditures, costs borne by the
agent in order to “... guarantee that he [the agent] will not take certain actions which would
harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such
actions” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
The residual loss is the third and final component of Jensen & Meckling’s definition
of agency costs. It is constituted by the real monetary costs borne by the principal due
to the agency relationship, after accounting for the above mentioned proactive attempts to
minimize them through monitoring and bonding costs.
2.2 CEO Compensation and Agency Costs
Instated compensation for the purpose of aligning the interests of the principal and the
agent can take different forms. In many cases, total compensation is constituted by fixed
salary, variable pay, other benefits, pension plans and long-term incentive plans. The vari-
able component of remuneration packages is included in an attempt to minimize agency
costs. Ba˚ng & Waldenstro¨m (2009) explain that if a CEO’s compensation is the only thing
of her interest, and if that compensation is fixed, she will not, in contrast to the share-
holders, be engaged in creating value for the firm. However if the CEO’s compensation is
made sensitive to changes in the firm’s value, the CEO’s interests will approach those of
the shareholders, and the agency problems will to some extent be overcome. The same pa-
per continues to explain the theoretical support of performance-tied pay. Firstly, variable
compensation allegedly increases the CEO’s effort put in the company. The CEO will have
higher incentive to create value for the firm if she takes part of the profits. Alternatively,
a CEO with a fixed pay will not work harder than what is demanded in order to keep her
job. Secondly, variable compensation limits the extent to which a CEO utilizes firm re-
sources privately. Examples of such actions include flying first class and overspending on
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company-paid dinners. Thirdly, Ba˚ng & Waldenstro¨m continue by explaining that variable
compensation can encourage risk-taking. Without an incentive pay, the CEO may defer
from taking on risky projects because of fear of losing her position. Being offered a piece
of the winnings may however allow also for risky projects to be invested in. Not pursuing
such risky, but profitable, projects, is often referred to as underinvestment.
2.3 Underinvestment
Another important agency cost is underinvestment. The phenomenon was theorized by
Myers (1977), who explains that “a firm with risky debt outstanding, and which acts in
its stockholders’ interest, will follow a different decision rule than one which can issue
risk-free debt or which issues no debt at all”. He states that there might be a risk of not
pursuing certain projects with positive NPV, when the costs of the project are fully borne
by the shareholders, but the profits are distributed to both bondholders and shareholders.
There is indeed an economic significance of the agency cost of underinvestment, and pre-
vious literature stipulates that there are different potential solutions to the problem (Mauer
& Ott, 2000). Kanagaretnam & Sarkar (2011) elaborate on the theory of underinvestment
in the context of managerial compensation, by viewing the manager’s regular, fixed salary
payments as regular interest payments, both of which cease in case of a bankruptcy. As
neither the manager nor the bondholders will risk losing these regular payments, their
interests align. This creates an incentive for managers not to pursue risky projects. On
the contrary, an incentive pay component aligns the manager’s interests with those of the
shareholders, as the CEO has an opportunity to receive an additional amount beyond the
regular salary payment. In other words, with only a fixed CEO salary, the threat of underin-
vestment increases. In contrast, adding a variable CEO compensation should theoretically
reduce underinvestment, since it makes managerial and shareholders’ interests of maxi-
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mizing firm value align. While Kanagaretnam & Sarkar consider equity ownership as the
incentive component, the same reasoning could be extended to other compensation pack-
ages linked to performance. Indeed, Brander & Poitevin (1992) speak of the incentive
component in terms of a ‘bonus’, and come to a similar conclusion: managerial contracts
can mitigate, and in some cases even eliminate, the agency costs of underinvestment.
2.4 Overinvestment
A problem closely related to that of underinvestment is what intuitively can be explained
as its opposite – overinvestment. There are incentives for managers to grow and increase
the size of the firm to such an extent that it becomes suboptimal. The intuition behind this
is that a larger firm naturally increases the resources under the managers’ control, and thus
their power (Jensen, 1986). Jensen continues this reasoning by explaining that, in the case
of substantial free cash flow in the firm, there are especially severe conflicts of interest
between shareholders and managers over payout policy. A potential consequence in such
situations is that cash may be spent on projects that erode rather than create value for the
firm. Managers can more readily accept a project when the firm keeps cash at hand, rather
than scenarios in which additional debt (or equity) must be issued to pursue it. By the
same reasoning as in the case of underinvestment, a compensation linked to performance
measures (and indirectly the value of the firm) should conflate the interests of shareholders
and managers also in the presence of overinvestment threats. Empire building is the term
used to describe the willingness of managers to involve the firm in negative NPV projects
to increase its size, in order to gain – for example – prestige, publicity, and the potentially
higher salary that large firms tend to pay their managers (Berk & Demarzo, 2014). Much
earlier research support this reasoning, showing that two effects are at work; (1) the re-
lationship between firm performance and CEO compensation, which creates incentives to
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maximize firm value, and (2) the relationship between firm size and CEO compensation,
which creates incentives to maximize firm size. The rationale for increasing firm size sub-
optimally does not end with higher salaries, but can more thoroughly be understood in
light of motivation theory.
2.5 Herzberg Motivation-Hygiene Theory
While compensation commonly is referred to as one of the most incentivizing tools for
steering management, there are somewhat contradicting motivation theories which take a
more psychological perspective. Herzberg’s Motivation-Hygiene Theory focuses on de-
terminants of job satisfaction and has had a major impact on the discussion, claiming
that “...pay contributes little to job satisfaction, all employees need to grow psychologi-
cally, and interpersonal relations are more likely to lead to dissatisfaction than satisfaction”
(Sachau, 2007). This theory, by extension, therefore suggests that a CEO should not per-
form considerably better only due to an increase in compensation, but that other motivating
factors are of importance. The study of Herzberg et al. (1993) elaborates specifically on
’motivator factors’, and ’hygiene factors’, where the first of which corresponds to condi-
tions that create job satisfaction. Herzberg et al. find that such motivators include, for
example, possibilities of professional growth, success in performance at work, and pres-
tige. These are factors specifically related to an employee’s tasks. The latter, hygiene
factors, are on the other hand conditions that need to be met for workers not to be dissatis-
fied at work. Hygiene factors include, among other components: salary, physical working
conditions and job safety. By the reasoning of this theory, other factors create job satisfac-
tion to a larger degree than salary, such as the feeling of self-fulfillment. This should have
an impact on the decisions made by CEOs, as well as on how to address their interests.
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3 Literature Review
The correlation between CEO compensation and company performance is a heavily re-
searched and well documented subject. Economists have long tried to conclude whether
there is a correlation between CEO compensation and the underlying performance of the
company or not, and if so, the causality of the matter. As discussed below, the statis-
tical testing in previous research is commonly conducted by regression analyses, while
variables and proxies may differ.
Coughlan & Schmidt (1985) investigate mentioned relationship by examining how
boards of directors use compensation and structural changes to control management in
corporations. The study focuses specifically on the relationship between the movement of
stock prices (as a proxy for firm performance) and managerial compensation. Coughlan
& Schmidt note that an information asymmetry between management and compensation
committees may exist. It is plausible that relevant information may be kept from the com-
mittee if said information would attribute a poor performance to top management. Further-
more, the study argues that “boards are captives of top management and make compensa-
tion decisions based only on the information supplied to them by that management”. This
information asymmetry entails an inherent risk that decisions on compensation are sub-
optimal, and that agency problems remain unsolved due to this captivation of the board.
Using a sample of 249 corporations and conducting regressions primarily on abnormal
returns, their research finds evidence that corporate boards can successfully relate man-
agerial compensation to the movement of the stock price in order to incentivize executive
officers. The study finally concludes that there is empirical evidence suggesting that deci-
sions on executive compensation plans tend to align the interests of shareholders and top
management.
These findings are later criticized by Kerr & Bettis (1987), who remark on the fact
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that Coughlan & Schmidt (1985) only are able to explain 5.4 % of the variation in man-
agerial compensation. Kerr & Bettis also find the method of including both bonus and
salary in the same category instead of treating them as two separate elements troublesome,
reasoning that the bonus a CEO receives in a given year is based on the performance in that
year, while a CEO’s salary is based on the board’s perception of the performance in the
preceding year. Altering the assumptions used in previous scientific articles investigating
the subject, Kerr & Bettis conclude that an abnormal return is not an important determi-
nant of CEO compensation and that the board of directors do not consider the performance
of the stock when allocating compensation to managers.
In 2000, Attaway conducted a similar study to that of Coughlan & Schmidt (1985), on
the computer and electronics industry in the US. Attaway’s study includes some changes
to Coughlan & Schmidt’s model. By including CEO age, job tenure, stock owned and
education as control variables in the regression model, Attaway aims to achieve a more
reliable model by reducing potential endogeneity problems. The modification, however,
does not lead to any substantial changes in the results – the relationship between per-
formance and compensation is deemed small but significant. Attaway also discusses the
limitation of excluding stock options and other long-term incentive plans in the model, and
the possible implications it could have on the outcome of the study. While the problem
may cause concern, he also notes that Lewellen & Huntsman (1970) conclude that using
salary and bonus cash payments works as a substitute for using total compensation. It is
necessary, however, to keep in mind that this conclusion is made in the context of Lewellen
& Huntsman’s study, and does not necessarily hold true for other samples. Furthermore, in
contrast to many other studies, Attaway uses ROE, rather than stock returns, as a proxy for
firm performance. The findings of Coughlan & Schmidt (1985) and Attaway (2000) – that
company performance is a small, but statistically significant explanatory variable for CEO
compensation – is consistent with the findings of several other studies. Jensen and Mur-
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phy (2010) discover in their study a similar small but significant relationship by examining
market value of firms as a proxy for firm performance together with total compensation.
The study concludes that “a $1,000 change in corporate value corresponds to a change in
CEO compensation of just $2.59”. Veliyath & Bishop (1995) who, like Attaway, use ROE
as performance measure on a specific industry, reach a similar conclusion concerning the
relationship. Lewellen & Huntsman (1970) do a comparable regression analysis but focus
also on reported profits as an explanatory variable, and report a result that is in line with
above mentioned research.
Contrary to the majority of studies conducted on managerial compensation and com-
pany performance, Madura et al. (1996) and Akhigbe et al. (1995) do not find conclusive
evidence of a correlation between the variables. Madura et al. study small publicly traded
companies from 1987 to 1991 in the US and use both the ROE of the previous year as well
as a five-year ROE average as proxies for firm performance. One possible explanation
mentioned by Madura et al. for their contradicting results is that institutional investors
have a lower ownership in small publicly listed companies compared to larger listed firms.
Therefore, the costs related to monitoring smaller firms are larger relative to the benefits
received, allowing smaller firms to set CEO compensations that may not be economically
justifiable.
Akhigbe et al. (1995) observe 350 firms over the same five-year period (1987-1991),
but instead of ROE, abnormal returns calculated using both the one factor model and the
three factor model are used as performance proxies. As previously stated, the empirical
results of Akhigbe et al. indicate a statistically insignificant relationship between CEO
compensation and firm performance. However, they further discuss the complexity of
choosing proxies for performance and state that “results obtained using alternative perfor-
mance measures were mixed, indicating that this empirical issue is highly sensitive to how
performance is proxied”.
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While the relationship between firm performance and managerial compensation has
been widely discussed, there is other research that focuses on other specific explanatory
variables for compensation. In particular, much research revolve around assessing the
impact of company size rather than performance on managerial compensation. Agarwal
(1981) describes a theory which explains that “the modern corporation tends to maximize
its size rather than profitability...”. The reason for this is to a large extent managers’ self-
interests, as the significant relationship between company size and compensation would
incentivize managers to increase firm size instead of maximizing firm value in order to
increase their compensation. Meeks & Whittington (1975) state that, notwithstanding
previous studies suggesting that the incentive effect of increasing firm size is stronger than
that of maximizing firm value, “when just the consequences of the limited range of policies
open to the firm in any one year are considered, it emerges that growth pays no better than
profitability”. The study sets this conclusion into perspective by stressing an issue with the
inference; while payments related to performance for the manager arrive in the subsequent
year only if the performance level is kept, growth payments have, as Meeks & Whittington
put it, a “ratchet effect”. They explain that “...on just the weak assumption that the current
year’s closing size is maintained [...], the growth premium is paid not just in the year in
which any growth is achieved, but for ever after”. Thus, there are difficulties in assessing
the relative incentive effects. The study merely concludes that there is evidence for a
non-trivial relationship between both firm size and performance, and compensation.
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4 Data
4.1 Sample Selection Procedure
The population in this study is large and mid cap companies listed on Nasdaq Stockholm
at the 1st of January 2019, totalling 96 large cap companies and 137 mid cap companies,
before any added restrictions. The first constraint limits the sample to only include com-
panies that have had the same CEO during the five-year period 2013-2017, respectively
2012/2013-2016/2017 if the company’s fiscal year does not coincide with the calendar
year. The reasoning behind the exclusion of companies with multiple CEOs during the pe-
riod is that it is mandatory that the same CEO has been in charge during the relevant period
in order to measure whether performance is truly linked to CEO remuneration (Madura et
al., 1996). Including values from years where one CEO left and another was appointed
would also impose problems regarding severance pay and signing bonuses.
The second constraint requires that a bonus system exists within the companies.
Since salaries commonly do not vary greatly over time, it is mainly the variable com-
pensation that is affected by the company’s performance. If a company does not have a
system in place that links the performance of the company to the CEO remuneration, it
suggests that no action is taken to align the CEO’s and company’s interests and that the
agency problem is prevalent.
In accordance with earlier research, the restrictions placed on the sample make the
values gathered in a manner not regarded as random (Attaway 2000), however this is
consistent with the sampling methods used in earlier research (Miller 1995).
The ROE and EPS measurements and the values of total assets are gathered from
the Bloomberg Terminal, while CEO specific information is gathered mainly from annual
reports complemented by data from S&P’s database CapitalIQ. Miller (1995) states that
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research on CEO compensation and company performance mostly use data from reliable
secondary sources. All ratios and values are on an annual basis for the given year 1.
The sample has been drawn randomly from the population until a total of 20 large cap
companies and 20 mid cap companies met all previously mentioned criteria to be included
in the sample, resulting in a total of 40 companies observed over a five year period.
4.2 Chosen Variables
4.2.1 CEO Compensation
The main dependent variable of the model is CEO compensation. The remuneration of
executives in corporations can take many forms. Regularly compensation plans include
both a base salary and a variable component, but often they also include longer term in-
centive plans such as pension and stock option plans. CEO compensation in the context of
this study, however, consists of cash payments to the CEO in the form of salary and bonus
only. The fundamental difference between the two is that bonus, in contrast to base salary,
should exclusively be based on performance. The main reason for excluding long-term
income is, as Kerr & Bettis (1987) note, that there are practical and methodological issues
with such measures, especially considering stock options. Continuing, previous research
indicates that salary and bonus can be used as a substitute for total compensation, which
include, for example, stock options (Lewellen & Huntsman, 1970). Furthermore, using
cash salary and bonus is common in previous research (Agarwal, 1981) and has the ad-
vantage of making the results of the study comparable to those of previous research. The
data on CEO compensation is gathered from annual reports of the firms in the sample for
the years 2013 through 2017.
1Bonuses are reported for the year that the bonus was based on even if the payment was made in the
subsequent fiscal year.
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4.2.2 Company Performance
Measures of company performance are part of the independent variables of interest in the
model; the regressors to be discussed in terms of having a direct impact on the dependent
variable – CEO compensation. The measures this study explores are, as established, ROE
and EPS. Using ROE over a five year period ensures that the true performance from a
shareholder perspective is captured; how well shareholders’ equity is employed in order
to create value. ROE is in this thesis calculated as
ROE =
Net Income
Average Shareholders’ Equity
This study also includes EPS as a performance proxy for true performance. While there
are several variations of the EPS measure, this study calculates an adjusted diluted EPS
measure that includes convertible securities and excludes one-time events that bring along
extraordinary gains and losses for the firm. These changes are illustrated in the following
formula:
EPS=
Net Income excl. Extraordinary Gains and Losses
Average Shares Outstanding incl. Convertible Securities
These adjustments arguably make the measure a better proxy for true performance, making
it more focused on a firm’s true core businesses and all its potential outstanding stock. The
reason for including EPS alongside ROE in this study is threefold. Firstly, as Ittner et al.
(1997) find, EPS is the financial metric most commonly used in annual bonus contracts.
Secondly, the measure has the advantage of being a very concrete and straightforward
measure in the context of agency problems – the actual amount of company earnings at-
tributable to each held share. Lastly, as previous research to a large extent focus on stock
price and ROE, it is of interest to investigate the effect of other performance measures with
less research precedence.
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4.2.3 Control Variables
In order to create a viable statistical model with limited endogeneity issues, a number of
control variables are included in the regression models. By adding antecedents which may
have an impact on CEO compensation to the regression models, the relationship between
CEO compensation and firm performance is clearer. Firstly, tenure of the CEOs is con-
trolled for. Data is gathered on the entrance year of the CEO, and for simplicity, it is
assumed that the starting date for all CEOs was consistently the 1st of January. Secondly,
the model controls for the age of the CEOs. Thirdly, to control for CEO equity stakes, data
on CEO ownership is collected from respective company’s annual reports. CEO ownership
is treated as the equity ownership without consideration of voting power 2. Finally, firm
size is controlled for in the model. Much prior research consider not only performance as
a determinant of managerial pay – but also firm size (Lewellen & Huntsman, 1970; Agar-
wal, 1981; Cubbin & Hall, 1983; Dyl, 1988). This study uses total assets as proxy for firm
size, as it is a straightforward and concrete measure. All data on total assets is gathered
from the Bloomberg Terminal for all five years.
2CEO ownership is calculated by dividing the total shares held by the CEO the current year with the total
amount of common shares outstanding.
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5 Methodology
5.1 Research Model
For the purpose of investigating the relationship between CEO compensation and company
performance, this study to a large extent rely upon methodology previously established in
other publications and research discussions on the subject. In particular, this thesis largely
follows the outline of that of Attaway’s “A Study of the Relationship Between Company
Performance and CEO Compensation” (2000), with some modifications. While Attaway’s
focus is on American companies, this study uses the same approach, but on Swedish large
and mid cap firms. In addition, a few alterations are made to the regression models in
terms of the independent variables included. The study is quantitatively conducted, and
the linear model is made up of dependent, independent and control variables.
The main dependent variable in this thesis is CEO compensation, which is constituted
by aggregate cash payments of salary and bonus. Moreover, for the purpose of deepening
the discussion regarding the relationship, regressions are run on CEO salary and bonus
independently. Continuing, the regressors affecting these dependent variables are divided
into variables of interest, and control variables. Aiming at capturing the relationship be-
tween CEO compensation and company performance, the variables of interest are the per-
formance measures ROE and EPS. The models furthermore control for other regressors
which possibly have an impact on CEO compensation, to circumvent econometric issues.
Such variables include CEO tenure, age and ownership, as well as total assets of the firms.
Panel data is used for the statistical testing, which is elaborated on in the following section.
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5.2 Econometric Analysis
After the sampling procedure, the data consists of 40 companies over a five-year period.
Due to the data being both cross-sectional and over multiple time periods, panel data re-
gressions are run to investigate the effects of performance on CEO compensation. Because
the study is conducted on both large and mid cap companies on Nasdaq Stockholm, the
nominal values of salaries, bonuses and total assets of the companies differ substantially.
Natural logarithms are therefore used in the regressions for CEO compensation and as-
sets, to examine the relative rather than the nominal effects. Additionally, the performance
variable EPS is logarithmically transformed to facilitate its interpretation and to accurately
identify its relationship with compensation. Adjustment for outliers is done by winsorizing
the data, decreasing the variability for all variables by substituting the one percent most
extreme values with the values of the 99th percentile.
Firstly, pooled OLS regressions are conducted on CEO cash compensation which in
this thesis amounts to the sum of salary and bonus, as well as on CEO salary and bonus
separately. Holding the control variables constant in all models while substituting the per-
formance measure allows for the correlation between compensation and the performance
variables to be examined separately and more thoroughly. It is important to note that the
results a pooled OLS regression generate are reliable only if there are no differences be-
tween companies in what factors affect the compensation given to the CEO, and will there-
fore only produce both efficient and consistent parameter estimates if an individual effect
does not exist. Since it is plausible that the model has omitted time-invariant variables
relating to individual effects between firms, the pooled OLS model may not be sufficient
alone. Therefore, the study includes an additional model that is able to account for such
effects. To decide whether a fixed or random effects regression model is preferable for this
purpose, a Hausman specification test is performed. The test compares fixed and random
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effects estimators with the null hypothesis that individual effects are uncorrelated with the
other regressors. If this is true, a random effects regression model gives a more efficient
result than its fixed effects counterpart.
The outputs of the Hausman specification tests reject the null hypotheses as presented
in Table II, Appendix. A fixed effects model is proven to outperform the random effects
model. Consequently, regressions using a fixed effects model are carried out on both ROE
and EPS as performance proxies on the dependent variables. Tenure and age must how-
ever be dropped from the models using fixed effects as these variables are perfectly corre-
lated with each other over time which causes issues of serial correlation. By including a
fixed effects model, this study accomplishes to account for firm-specific effects, something
much previous work that merely use pooled OLS regressions, lack (Kerr & Bettis, 1987;
Akhigbe et al., 1995; Attaway, 2000). However, the pooled OLS regression is still useful
in complementing the fixed effects model as it does not omit tenure and age as experience
proxies, causing the probability of endogeneity to be lower.
5.3 Statistical Tests and Robustness
Numerous tests are performed to certify that appropriate models are used to obtain trust-
worthy results. To ensure avoidance of multicollinearity, correlation between regressors
and VIF ratios are observed. Correlation between tenure and ownership is present but is
relatively low and does not pose any significant econometric problems. Low VIF values
in the regression models using EPS and ROE suggest that the models do not suffer from
multicollinearity and no variables need to be dropped. Controlling for serial correlation
is done using a Wooldridge test. The test provides evidence of first-order autocorrelation
being present in both the fixed effects and pooled OLS models using ROE and EPS as per-
formance measures. The presence of heteroskedasticity is examined by running a modified
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Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity on the fixed effects model, which rejects the
null hypothesis. White’s test for heteroskedasticity gives similar results indicating that the
variance of the error term increases as the values of the independent variables grow. Test-
ing for cross-sectional dependence is not possible for the dataset this thesis is based upon
as there is an insufficient amount of observations. As the data is heteroskedastic and auto-
correlation is prevalent, Huber-White estimators are not adequate in generating unbiased
standard errors. Instead, as cross-sectional dependence could be present, Driscoll-Kraay
standard errors are used as they adjust for the potential inadequacies of the models.
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6 Empirical Results
The empirical results of this study bring forward interesting inferences regarding CEO
compensation on the Swedish market. The results presented draw attention to primar-
ily the study’s performance variables of interest – ROE and EPS. However, in line with
previous research, the report also notes firm size as an important explanatory variable of
compensation, together with some contrasting results regarding other control variables.
6.1 Hypothesis 1: Does ROE have an impact on CEO compensation?
Table I and II present the regression outputs of the two statistical models that include
ROE as the explanatory performance proxy. First, by observing Table I it is apparent
that ROE is significant on the one percent level with an approximate coefficient of 0.009
when running a pooled OLS regression. Table II presents the corresponding fixed effects
model and too concludes strong significance, and a similar rounded figure of 0.009 as the
coefficient. The basic interpretation of these results is that a one percentage unit increase
in ROE relates to an approximate 0.9 % positive change in CEO compensation. In light
of agency theory, the implication of this relationship is that compensation plans of CEOs
on the Swedish market successfully help to reduce agency costs. With this statistically
supported relationship at hand, the conclusion can be made that CEOs on the Swedish
market benefit financially from maximizing firm value by increasing performance. This
supports the notion that compensation plans are set to align the interests of the principal
and the agent. This should theoretically limit unwanted behavior by the CEO in the form
of over- and underinvestment, as well as other value eroding activities such as excessive
utilization of firm resources. On the basis of these regression outputs, it is thus clear that
performance is significantly related to CEO cash compensation when considering ROE as
proxy for true performance.
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Table I: ROE – Pooled OLS
lCompensation lSalary lBonus
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
P.Value
Regression
Coefficient
P.Value
Regression
Coefficient
P.Value
ROE .0086515 .001 .0042272 .014 .0181594 .001
lAssets .3053408 .000 .2764959 .000 .4686533 .000
Ownership -.0436963 .000 -.0353524 .000 -.0209884 .002
Tenure .0261583 .006 .0270565 .002 .0234600 .139
Age -.0090142 .002 -.0112683 .000 -.0240350 .049
Table II: ROE – Fixed Effects
lCompensation lSalary lBonus
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
P.Value
Regression
Coefficient
P.Value
Regression
Coefficient
P.Value
ROE .0090308 .005 .0029170 .005 .0138242 .009
lAssets .4475452 .001 .3536459 .001 .6179014 .001
Ownership .0055186 .250 -.0037277 .321 .0400210 .010
Continuing, the results regarding ROE in above tables are in line with previous research
by Veliyath & Bishop (1995) and Attaway (2000), who find a similar relationship be-
tween ROE and CEO compensation. Considering Attaway’s approximate ROE coefficient
of 0.006, it should be noted that the models in this study yield a relatively stronger re-
lationship between the variables. Conversely, the relationship established in this thesis
contradicts conclusions made in the work of Madura et al. (1996), who do not find a
significant link between performance and compensation in their sample.
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It is of interest to reflect upon the underlying reasons for the different results. It is
important to note in this discussion that Madura et al., in contrast to the other studies men-
tioned, focus on a sample of small firms. Conversely, this thesis adopts a more general
approach, with a sample consisting of firms with various sizes. The lacking empirical evi-
dence for a significant relationship in the study of Madura et al. may therefore stem from
structural differences between firms of different sizes. As Madura et al. also note, smaller
firms’ stock tend to be lesser held by institutional investors, resulting in weaker corpo-
rate governance. This can give rise to unjustified compensation packages, which would
explain the lacking evidence for a relationship between compensation and performance
in their study, but which is prominent in this thesis. Furthermore, it should be noted that
Veliyath & Bishop and Attaway who concur with the results of this thesis, focus on specific
industries. In contrast, this study is delimited by its lacking acknowledgment of industry-
specific effects. When considering studies on the same topic but with other performance
proxies than ROE, it is apparent that the results regarding performance and compensation
in this thesis are heavily supported by previous work by for example Lewellen & Hunts-
man (1970), Coughlan & Schmidt (1985) and Jensen & Murphy (2010).
Further examining the relationship between CEO compensation and performance,
Table I and II also present the outputs of regressions that include CEO salary and bonus
separately as dependent variables. Observing these results, some remarks can be made.
Firstly, it is evident that ROE is deemed significant in explaining both salary and bonus
separately in both statistical models, on at least the five percent significance level. In effect,
this means that a change in ROE is reflected in both salary and bonus payments to CEOs.
Thus, it appears that performance is considered when setting both salary and bonus pay-
ments to CEOs on the Swedish market. Secondly, while a relationship does exist between
ROE and salary, it is weak in comparison to the performance variable’s corresponding re-
lationship with CEO bonus. It appears that the relationship between ROE and bonus is
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considerably stronger than that of ROE and salary across the different models. These re-
sults are expected, as bonus is the main variable compensation component. The regression
outputs show that the coefficients of ROE in the model with CEO salary range between
0.003 and 0.004 approximately. Simultaneously, the model with CEO bonus as depen-
dent variable obtains positive ROE coefficients between 0.014 and 0.018. Accordingly,
compensation plans on the Swedish market are designed to incentivize CEOs to improve
company performance, with both salary, and more importantly bonus, varying with ROE.
6.2 Hypothesis 2: Does EPS have an impact on CEO compensation?
Table III and IV present regression outputs that include EPS as proxy for true performance.
Examining these results, it is evident that the models yield results concordant with those of
the models using ROE as the variable of interest. The empirical evidence is indicative of
a significant, yet weak positive relationship between EPS and CEO compensation. While
there is lacking research precedence on EPS and compensation, the results of this thesis
can be considered somewhat in line with above conclusions. EPS seem to be an important
financial metric in setting compensation also on the Swedish market, on the basis of its
statistically significant explanatory power in this study.
As with ROE, the relationship between EPS and bonus is substantially stronger than
that with salary, as expected since bonuses are set based on performance while salaries
tend to be more consistent over time. The positive EPS coefficients of 0.054 and 0.078 for
the pooled and fixed models on CEO salary respectively imply that salary is also affected
by a firm’s accomplishments. However, these are not significant on a five percent level and
more research is required for definitive conclusions to be drawn.
Interestingly the coefficients of the logged EPS variable are systematically higher
than ROE’s counterpart suggesting that the correlation with compensation is stronger for
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Table III: EPS – Pooled OLS
lCompensation lSalary lBonus
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
P.Value
Regression
Coefficient
P.Value
Regression
Coefficient
P.Value
lEPS .1116375 .010 .0543889 .077 .2212450 .009
lAssets .2647085 .000 .2563831 .000 .3853846 .000
Ownership -.0451185 .001 -.0379588 .001 -.0168159 .009
Tenure .0250877 .014 .0283787 .004 .0161155 .277
Age -.0087272 .100 -.0111184 .027 -.0271436 .007
Table IV: EPS – Fixed Effects
lCompensation lSalary lBonus
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
P.Value
Regression
Coefficient
P.Value
Regression
Coefficient
P.Value
lEPS .1797789 .039 .0780830 .091 .2726947 .008
lAssets .3484194 .023 .3115442 .008 .4524665 .008
Ownership .0076385 .192 -.0029433 .385 .0429771 .001
EPS (Table IX, Appendix). Since previous studies focus mainly on other performance
measures such as abnormal returns (Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Kerr & Bettis, 1987;
Akhibe et al., 1996) or a company’s market value (Madura et al., 1995; Jensen & Murphy,
2010), it is peculiar why more research has not been done on the topic, considering EPS
as a measure of true firm performance. A possibility is that EPS is generally seen as easily
manipulated by managers, which hurts its reliability and trustworthiness. Nevertheless,
the results in this study show that EPS is an important determinant of CEO compensation.
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6.3 Further Implications
Investigating the overall results of the regressions displayed in Table I through IV, it is evi-
dent that there are other significant determinants of CEO compensation than performance.
The meaningful impact of total assets on CEO compensation supported by the statistical
models presented allows for an interesting discussion regarding to what extent firm size
affects the compensation paid out to CEOs. Several previous studies address, in addition
to performance, firm size as an important explanatory variable for compensation (Meeks
& Whittington, 1975; Agarwal, 1981). The results of this study show that total assets
consistently appear significant as an explanatory variable for CEO compensation with re-
gression coefficients ranging from approximately 0.265 to 0.448 in the different models.
Considering the logarithmic transformation of the total assets variable, the interpretation
of these results is that a one percent increase in total assets is followed by an increase in
compensation of between 0.265 and 0.448 %. Previous studies by Meeks & Whittington
(1975) and Agarwal (1981) concur with the conclusion that firm size is linked to compen-
sation. Continuing, it becomes evident that there are two different organizational factors
affecting CEO compensation: firm performance and firm size. The very fact that both
these variables’ coefficients are significant and positive means that CEOs on the Swedish
market hypothetically have two options to increase compensation; either by increasing
the size of the firm or by improving performance. The tradeoff apparent from these re-
sults puts the goal of reducing agency costs at risk, as CEOs may still engage in empire
building and undertake projects that increase the size of the company, but conversely and
simultaneously, may negatively impact the performance of the firm. Under the assumption
that the only goal for CEOs is to maximize their own compensation, CEOs will focus on
the variable that makes this possible. Even though the regression coefficients for ROE and
EPS are consistently higher than those of the total assets variable, the different units make
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comparisons meaningless, leaving conclusions of the relative strengths of the variables for
further research. Continuing, when relaxing the assumption that compensation is the only
thing of interest, other incentive forces can influence the decisions made by CEOs. In
this case, notwithstanding a statistically explained performance-tied compensation, CEOs
may still engage in activities to increase firm size at the cost of performance. Accord-
ing to Herzberg’s et al. (1993) Motivation-Hygiene Theory, many factors influence job
satisfaction. Intuitively, CEOs should engage in activities that not merely increase com-
pensation, but also satisfaction at work. This reasoning is relevant in order to understand
and nuance the results in an agency theory context. The empirical evidence shows that
performance-tied compensation should help reduce agency costs, however complemen-
tary theory suggests that it is inadequate in removing agency costs completely. Despite
this reasoning, the statistical models generate values indicative of a statisically significant
relationship between compensation and firm size.
In addition to above discussed variables, several control variables in the models are
proven to hold significant explanatory power. Some of these results, however, are ambigu-
ous across the models. First, the regression output of the ownership variable deserves a
closer examination. Tending first exclusively to the pooled OLS regressions presented in
Table I & III, the variable exhibits significance on the one percent level. As presented,
the coefficients of ownership in the ROE and EPS pooled OLS models on total CEO cash
compensation are approximately - 0.044 and - 0.045, respectively. The interpretation of
these coefficients is as follows: a one percentage unit increase in ownership results in a
change in compensation of - 4.4 % (- 4.5 %). In other words, the pooled OLS models
alone indicate that as CEO ownership increases, compensation, in terms of salary and
bonus, decreases. The regressions run on salary and bonus separately show similar results.
This is in line with Attaway (2000), who also finds a significant, negative relationship
when running a pooled OLS regression model. There are a number of possible reasons for
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a negative relationship between CEO ownership and compensation. First and foremost,
holding company stock generates a separate source of income for CEOs, in addition to
regular compensation. The CEO is entitled to dividends as well as any capital gains that
the stock yields. This has an incentivizing effect for improving firm performance. By this
reasoning, the negative ownership coefficient can be partly theoretically explained; a CEO
may, when possible, use her voting power and influence to decline a certain level of com-
pensation, in favor of keeping the funds in the firm to pursue value adding activities. By
doing this, the CEO also benefits from the additional trust instilled in her management of
the firm due to such a prioritization. Another possible reason for the negative relationship
that this study finds, can potentially be explained in terms of tax laws. In general, taxes on
capital gains are lower than income taxes in Sweden. With this information at hand, there
may be reasons for CEOs to use their voting power to increase firm dividend payments.
From a tax perspective, it can be advantageous for a CEO to decline a higher compensa-
tion while simultaneously increasing the dividend payout. While the results presented in
Table I and III show that the variable is significant, it is important to recall the important
delimitation regarding CEO ownership – ownership has been calculated as the percentage
of equity, and not voting power, that the CEO holds. The data also excludes shares that are
held indirectly by the CEO through third party ventures.
When instead investigating the ownership variable in the fixed effects regression out-
puts in Table II & IV, it is evident that the results to some extent contradict those of the
pooled OLS models. In contrast to these models, the fixed effects models cannot generally
conclude that the ownership variable is significant. In addition, the signs of the coefficients
are conversely positive in some outputs of these models. One must investigate these results
on an econometric level. Firstly, the exclusion of the control variables tenure and age has
a direct impact on the regression outputs. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the
variation of ownership in the sample is high, ranging from around zero percent to approx-
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imately 48.7 % after adjusting for outliers (Table I, Appendix). This variation is directly
reflected in the pooled OLS model. However, the fixed effects models, acknowledging the
existence of firm-specific effects, account more specifically for the variations in ownership
within firms. A closer examination of the data shows that these within-firm variations are
low. Specifically, CEO ownership does not change more than one percent unit across the
time periods, with the exception of merely two firms. The insignificance of the ownership
variable in these models ultimately makes drawing any conclusion on the change of signs
difficult on any meaningful level.
Finally, the control variables CEO tenure and age show varying significance in the
two pooled OLS models. In the ROE and EPS models, tenure is significant on a one
percent and five percent level, respectively. The signs of the coefficients are consistently
positive, with coefficient values of 0.026 and 0.025. This positive relationship is intuitive,
with a higher compensation following a higher number of years within the company as
the human capital of the CEO increases. Interpreting these values, a one year increase in
tenure results in an approximate 2.5-2.6 % increase in compensation. Also these results
are in line with those of Attaway’s (2000), who similarly conclude a positive, weak re-
lationship between tenure and compensation. Continuing, the variable age is significant
on the one percent level in the ROE pooled OLS regression, but turns insignificant with
a p-value of 0.100 in the EPS model. The models yield similar small coefficients with
an approximate value of 0.009 in both models, with negative signs. The negative signs of
these coefficients, notwithstanding its weakness, may seem counterintuitive. Indeed previ-
ous studies hypothesize that CEO age should be positively correlated with compensation,
for example by Madura et al. (1996). It is plausible, however, that the negative relation-
ship found in this thesis may be an issue of non-linearity of the variable. Considering that
age in this thesis is handled as a strictly linear variable, it fails to capture the true effect
if a CEO’s ability to generate value for the firm fluctuates over time. Another possible
30
explanation is if there indeed are regional differences regarding how CEO compensation
changes as age increases. This would be the case if the age of the CEO is for any reason
less important when making compensation decisions in Sweden than in the US.
6.4 Suggestions for Further Research
While this study can conclude general relationships between the independent variables
and CEO compensation on the Swedish market, the broadness of the topic in question
allows for a more thorough analysis of the relationship to be made. As established, this
study does not account for any industry specific factors. It is plausible that the structures
of compensation plans differ across industries, making this investigation interesting for
further research. Another aspect worth examining more thoroughly is the differences in
compensation determinants across countries. The majority of the studies done on the
subject focus on the US. While this study is done on Swedish firms, the countries are
similar in terms of the level of corporate governance. Further research deserves to be made
in countries with different levels of corporate governance in order to understand whether
this factor has an impact on how firms set compensation. Finally, this study focuses strictly
on compensation to the CEO. It is reasonable that also other senior managers have an
impact on firm performance. Therefore, the scope of the research on the topic could be
extended to include compensation to all senior managers, and not merely the CEO.
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7 Conclusion
With an increasing compensation level for CEOs around the globe, it is of utmost impor-
tance to understand its rationale and justifiability. By investigating firms on the Swedish
market, this study concludes a number of noteworthy results. Firstly, the study reports a
positive, significant relationship between CEO compensation and company performance.
Thus, the null hypotheses of the thesis are rejected. While the correlations are weak, the
significant relationships indicate that performance is an explanatory variable for compen-
sation using both ROE and EPS as proxies. Secondly, the same conclusion holds when
investigating the compensation components salary and bonus independently, where the
strongest relationship is found between bonus and performance. As the results are to a
large extent in line with previous research, it is not evidently so that differences over time
and region exist, in regard to compensation plans. Finally, these results also support the
notion that compensation is used as an incentivizing tool in order to reduce agency costs.
From this study, it can thus be deduced that compensation packages on the Swedish market
are designed to align the interests of shareholders and CEOs.
In addition to the performance variables, the study finds significant relationships with
several other variables. Firm size, proxied by total assets, is positively correlated with
CEO compensation, which supports previous studies claiming that firm size is a significant
determinant. The results indicate that a tradeoff exists for CEOs on the Swedish market,
regarding whether to increase the size of the firm, or improve its profitability in order
to maximize compensation. With these results at hand, it appears that firms bear a risk
of suboptimal CEO behavior. A relative comparison between the incentivizing effects of
increasing firm size and improving performance is not in the scope of this thesis, but left
for further research.
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Another finding of this study includes the role of CEO ownership as a compensation
determinant. While the models yield somewhat different results regarding this variable, the
study indicates an overall negative relationship between the variable and compensation.
The variables tenure and age, serving as experience proxies, give some conflicting results.
The results show that tenure is positively related to remuneration while age has a negative
coefficient, indicating that compensation increases with work place experience rather than
with age.
This study contributes to the overall discussion on the topic of CEO compensation.
The concordance of these and previous results supports the claim that CEO compensation
is, at least to some extent, justified. The study is thus able to draw the final conclusion that
compensation plans do help in reducing agency costs – an inherently existing problem in
relationships between CEOs and shareholders.
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9 Appendix
Table I: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean SD Min Max
Comp.* 9 664 8 861 1 601 38 400
Salary 6 242 4 946 1 399 23 700
Bonus 3 410 4 360 0 22 300
ROE 17.43728 12.18954 -15.19500 60.48500
EPS 7.98665 9.96460 -1.33500 60.47000
Assets** 29.17843 76.61320 .16190 512.99760
Ownership 2.93542 8.35469 .00150 48.70250
Tenure 51.54500 5.58155 37 64
Age 10.29000 7.39251 2 41
*Compensation in thousands (SEK)
**Assets in billions (SEK)
Table II: Hausman Specification Tests
Model Chi-square Significance
ROE 9.44 .0240
EPS 8.48 .0379
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Table III: Correlation Matrix
lComp. lSalary lBonus ROE lEPS lAssets Ownership Age Tenure
lComp. 1.0000
lSalary .9565 1.0000
lBonus .8770 .7247 1.0000
ROE -.1226 -.1495 -.0423 1.0000
lEPS .5490 .5096 .5249 .0811 1.0000
lAssets .8210 .8122 .6856 -.2192 .5369 1.0000
Ownership -.2201 -.1787 -.2858 .0270 -.1966 -.3715 1.0000
Age .2657 .2815 .1391 .0269 .1475 .3392 -.0411 1.0000
Tenure .1153 .1671 -.0250 -.0532 .0413 -.0770 .5254 .2713 1.0000
Table IV: VIF - ROE
Compensation Salary Bonus
Variable VIF VIF VIF
ROE 1.14 1.14 1.10
Assets 1.34 1.34 1.42
Ownership 2.46 2.46 1.65
Tenure 2.73 2.73 1.57
Age 1.60 1.61 1.31
Mean 1.86 1.86 1.41
Table V: VIF - EPS
Compensation Salary Bonus
Variable VIF VIF VIF
EPS 1.42 1.42 1.43
Assets 1.63 1.64 1.75
Ownership 2.57 2.57 1.65
Tenure 2.88 2.89 1.60
Age 1.49 1.50 1.28
Mean 2.00 2.00 1.54
Table VI: Wooldrige Tests for Serial Correlation
Model F.Value Significance
ROE - Pooled 19.113 .0001
ROE - FE 28.349 .0000
EPS - Pooled 14.318 .0005
EPS - FE 21.436 .0000
38
Table VII: Modified Wald Tests for Heteroskedasticity in Fixed Effects Models
Compensation Salary Bonus
Model Chi-square Significance Chi-square Significance Chi-square Significance
ROE 93 410.65 .0000 15 938.19 .0000 1.2e+05 .0000
EPS 5.0e+05 .0000 27 369.67 .0000 2.2e+05 .0000
Table VIII: White Tests for Heteroskedasticity in Pooled OLS Models
Compensation Salary Bonus
Model Chi-square Significance Chi-square Significance Chi-square Significance
ROE 124.59 .0000 125.11 .0000 51.88 .0001
EPS 123.04 .0000 124.08 .0000 48.53 .0004
Table IX: Standardized Comparison of Variables
Standardized ROE Standardized EPS
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
P.Value Variable
Regression
Coefficient
P.Value
ROE .1042436 .003 EPS .1132100 .003
Assets .3054261 .000 Assets .2654759 .000
Ownership -.0440785 .000 Ownership -.0455261 .000
Tenure .0265237 .000 Tenure .0254852 .001
Age -.0089378 .220 Age -.0086685 .238
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Table X: List of Companies in Sample
Large cap Mid cap
Addtech Acando
Ahlstrom-Munksjo¨ Besqab
Assa Abloy Bilia
AstraZeneca BTS Group
Autoliv Concentric
Boliden Elanders
Hexagon Enea
JM Fagerhult
Latour G5 Entertainment
Lifco Gra¨nges
Lundbergfo¨retagen HiQ International
Modern Times Group HMS Networks
NetEnt Inwido
Oriflame Knowit
SSAB Midsona
Securitas Nederman Holdings
Sweco RaySearch Laboratories
Tieto SkiStar
Trelleborg Tobii
Vitrolife VBG Group
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